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God, Goodness, and Philosophy, ed. Harriet A. Harris. Burlington, VT: Ash-
gate, 2011. 276 pages. $39.95 paper.
RAYMOND J. VANARRAGON, Bethel University
This is an interesting and worthwhile book, containing papers presented 
at a 2009 conference on “God and Morality,” hosted by the British Society 
for the Philosophy of Religion. It must have been a good conference. The 
collection does not hold together perfectly well, but on the whole there is 
much in it of interest on God’s goodness, God’s relation to morality, and 
similar topics.
The collection is framed by a discussion of philosophy of religion it-
self. Harriet Harris’s introduction and Victoria S. Harrison’s first chapter 
(“What’s the Use of Philosophy of Religion?”) raise and suggest responses 
to problems with the discipline. The main target is analytic philosophy 
of religion, the alleged problem with it being that it is irrelevant because 
it tackles issues that matter only to specialists and are disconnected from 
real world problems. Harrison takes seriously but ultimately rejects Nick 
Trakakis’s contention that analytic philosophy of religion is useless and 
that its practitioners should find something else to do (30), and she is 
friendlier to John Schellenberg’s less radical suggestion that the central 
topic of the discipline should be religion itself rather than technical issues 
within specific religious traditions (34–35). Harrison’s own recommenda-
tion is that philosophers of religion should become better versed in other 
areas of philosophy (she mentions particularly metaphysics and ethics) 
and draw on the resources from a variety of religious traditions in order 
to become more relevant to the world outside the academy.
There is much to question in Harrison’s diagnosis and suggested cure 
for what ails the discipline. For one thing, many prominent philosophers 
of religion today are experts in metaphysics or ethics. (Some are also ex-
perts in epistemology, a field that Harrison fails to mention despite the 
fact that many of the problems she says a relevant philosophy of religion 
might respond to—including those arising from tension between religious 
belief and science and those concerning the nature of evidence [42]—are 
clearly epistemological problems.) So to a considerable degree the sort of 
intra-disciplinary exchange of ideas that Harrison promotes is already 
happening. Her description of the current state of the field also raises 
questions. She writes, for example, that “even now most philosophy of re-
ligion remains focused on philosophical puzzles connected with the con-
cept of God” (33), an undefended claim that obscures the range of issues 
with which contemporary philosophers of religion are in fact engaged. 
And consider the charge of irrelevance. While some work in philosophy 
of religion is no doubt well removed from the concerns of many religious 
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believers, the same can be said of work in any academic discipline. The 
fact is, different people are interested in different issues (as Harris puts 
it in her introduction, “relevance is in the mind of the beholder” [18]), 
and academics tend to pursue their subjects where few can or care to fol-
low. Analytic philosophy of religion is hardly unique in this regard. So 
while it is true that analytic philosophers of religion should reflect on their 
discipline and strive to increase its relevance—and Harrison makes good 
points about the importance of doing so in a multicultural world—parts 
of her assessment of the problem and solution seem eminently debatable.
After the introductory reflections on philosophy of religion, the rest of 
the book is divided into two parts, with each part itself split in half. Part 
I is titled “Goodness, Morality, and Transcendence” and is divided into 
sections containing chapters on divine command theory and on evolution 
and morality. Part II is on “Evil and the Goodness of God,” and includes 
sections on divine omnibenevolence and moral responsibility. Here I offer 
a brief overview and highlight some points of significance, though of 
course I am not able to highlight them all.
Part I kicks off with an accessible essay, “The Source of Goodness,” in 
which John Cottingham contends that God does not create goodness or 
beauty itself (54). God instead creates beautiful things and performs good 
actions. If that is all God does, then it seems that God plays no role as the 
source of goodness, since, in theory at least, beautiful things can be made 
and good actions performed in a world without God. Cottingham argues, 
however, that God still plays a significant role when it comes to moral ac-
tions, because in a world with no God there would be no explanation for 
why certain features of those actions provide a categorical reason to perform 
them. A world with God, by contrast, does include such an explanation, 
namely, that by performing them we are drawn towards God, “the source 
of our being and source of all that is good” (58). Or so says Cottingham. 
While sympathetic to the general point, I was not convinced by his theistic 
explanation of moral obligation. It seems strange that the categorical reason 
I have for helping my neighbor is that doing so helps me.
The other chapters in the section on divine command theory are also 
well worth reading. Timothy Chappell, in “Euthyphro’s ‘Dilemma,’” ar-
gues that Socrates’s target in his discussion with Euthyphro was not divine 
command ethics itself, but was instead a version of it that seeks guidance 
from the misbehaving gods of Greek mythology. Chappell’s discussion is 
instructive and includes a fairly extensive survey of Plato’s writings on the 
relation of God to morality. The next chapter turns away from Plato and 
to the Hebrew Bible. In “Beyond Divine Command Theory,” Jaco Gericke 
makes the case for what he calls “moral realism” in the Hebrew Bible, 
and finds passages that presuppose “an objective moral order in relation 
to which Yhwh appears to have changed and with reference to which his 
nature may be described” (95). The final chapter, by Anders Kraal, de-
fends a divine simplicity solution to the Euthyphro problem (according 
to which God’s goodness and God’s will are identical, thereby disarming 
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the dilemma which essentially asks which takes priority) primarily by de-
fending the notion of divine simplicity from a well-known attack on it by 
Alvin Plantinga.
The section on “Evolution and the Grounds of Morality” begins with an 
interesting piece by Roger Scruton, in which he argues that we cannot give 
a complete account of sexual morality without employing such concepts 
as pollution, defilement, and purity; that contemporary liberalism, which 
roots morality in human autonomy and rights, has dropped such con-
cepts from our moral vocabulary; and that evolutionary psychology, while 
explaining how such notions might be adaptive, can do nothing by way 
of giving them ontological legitimacy. These concepts, as well as notions 
of piety, sacrilege, and the sacred, are essential to our moral experience 
(they help explain, for example, our feeling of revulsion towards rape), 
and point us to a transcendental ground of morality. Scruton’s discussion 
of sexual morality (and also of marriage and family) is colored a bit by 
his tendency towards overstatement and oversimplification. He seems to 
think that liberalism bears primary responsibility for the proverbial break-
down of society (“It is not an accident that our own societies are becoming 
increasingly childless and that children are growing up without the basic 
forms of accountability to others and capacity for attachment and love. 
These developments are an inevitable consequence, as soon as people 
acquire the habit of thinking of themselves in the ways assumed by the 
official liberal position” [120]). But the issues he addresses are significant 
and serve again to raise questions about the sources and legitimacy of our 
moral intuitions.
The other two essays on evolution and morality consider similar issues 
from different directions. In the brief chapter “Evolution and Agapeistic 
Ethics,” Robin Attfield argues that our evolutionary heritage is compat-
ible with our behaving in genuinely altruistic ways. In “God, Ethics, and 
Evolution,” Herman Philipse rejects Francis Collins’s contention that al-
truistic behavior can only be explained by appeal to God, and goes on to 
explore the ethical implications of evolutionary theory. His informative 
and wide-ranging discussion should be helpful to anyone interested in 
recent scholarship on the topic.
Part II of the book begins with a section on “The Parameters of Omni-
benevolence.” Dan O’Brien argues, in “God, Omniscience, and Under-
standing Evil,” that omniscience and perfect goodness are incompatible, 
in so far as understanding sinners and knowing their sinful thoughts re-
quires empathizing with them in a way that would not be possible for a 
morally perfect being. Ioanna-Maria Patsalidou makes the case, against 
Eleonore Stump, that God is not good to those in hell by preserving them 
in being and permitting them to live out their sinful natures, since their 
being may deteriorate as they continue to sin, and their sinful natures 
may be unfulfilled because of the lack of innocent victims to torment. 
Patsalidou suggests that in such cases God’s goodness may be demon-
strated to hell’s inhabitants not by allowing their existence to continue, but 
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instead by annihilating them. A third essay, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, con-
tains an illuminating exploration of the relation of generosity to justice, 
framed by a discussion of Jesus’s parable of the laborers in the vineyard. In 
that parable, laborers employed for only a short time are generously paid 
the same as the laborers who worked the full day. Wolterstorff argues that 
this arrangement was not unjust—the full-day laborers were not wronged 
by not receiving additional pay—and that the Aristotelian formula for 
justice in distributions that might yield the conclusion that it was unjust 
is mistaken. Wolterstorff does not pursue the matter, but readers might 
ponder how his conclusions fit with their own views on the distribution 
of divine salvific grace.
The final section of the book, titled “God and Moral Responsibility,” 
contains an unusual pair of essays that address what some lesser-known 
philosophers have said on that topic, fairly loosely construed. The first, 
by Vasil Gluchman, contains reflections on the work of two eighteenth-
century Lutheran theologians, Pavel Jakobei and Augustin Dolezal, who 
held different views on sin and evil. Gluchman mostly surveys their ideas 
and does not include an analysis of which thinker may have been closer to 
the truth. In the second essay, Alicja A. Gescinska explains the later work 
of German philosopher Max Scheler and tries to show its connection to his 
earlier work. One of Scheler’s controversial claims in this later work is that 
we create God rather than the other way around, an apparent departure 
from his earlier views that (unsurprisingly) did not impress his Catholic 
contemporaries. While this essay will be of interest to those familiar with 
Scheler and his style of thinking, Gescinska does more to explain where 
the thinking came from than to render it compelling.
In short, while the final section of the book does not really fit with what 
has come before it, the book as a whole contains a valuable collection of 
essays on an interesting set of topics.
God and Moral Obligation, by C. Stephen Evans. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 199 pages. $99.00 cloth.
MARK C. MURPHY, Georgetown University
Fifteen years have passed since the publication of Robert M. Adams’s Finite 
and Infinite Goods, in which Adams argued for a thoroughgoingly theistic 
account of moral properties.1 One piece of Adams’s account was a divine 
command theory of moral obligation, on which being morally obligatory is 
1Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
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